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standard at the administrative hearing had they inquired, the court
424
refused to find section 31-53(a) unpermissibly vague.

Finally, the court addressed plaintiffs' due process challenge to
section 31-53(a). The court stated that due process protection
afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment provides a party in an
administrative proceeding "the opportunity to be heard with
timely and adequate notice advising as to the reasons for the
[proceeding], the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and to
call witnesses on its behalf, and the opportunity to present
arguments and evidence."425 Due to the fact that plaintiffs did
not claim they failed to receive notice of the proceeding, or were
deprived of an opportunity to present their case and challenge the
DEP's case, the court found no basis to support a due process
challenge. 426

People v. C.M. 4 2 7
(decided April 29, 1994)

In People v. C.M.,428 the Supreme Court, New York County
addressed what it found to be an issue of first impression in New
York; 42 9 whether a defendant may waive his federal
constitutional4 30 or state statutory43 1 right to a public trial,
424. New Amber, 619 N.Y.S.2d at 501.
425. Id. at 500 (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970)).
426. NewAmber, 619 N.Y.S.2d at 500.
427. 161 Misc. 2d 574, 614 N.Y.S.2d 491 (Sup. Ct. New York County
1994).
428. Id.
429. Id. at 575, 614 N.Y.S.2d at 492.
430. Id. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment provides in
pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy die right
to a. ..public trial... ."Id.
431. N.Y. CIv. RIGHTS LAW § 12 (McKinney 1992). This section provides
in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused has a right to
a... public trial ......

Id. The right is also protected under New York

Judiciary Law § 4 (McKinney 1992). This section provides in pertinent part:
The sittings of every court within this state shall be public, and every
citizen may freely attend ... except that in... cases for divorce,

seduction, abortion, rape, assault with intent to commit rape,
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during his testimony, as of right. 432 The court held that the
defendant's right to waive a public trial was not absolute and,
therefore, did not give him a constitutional or statutory right to
exclude the entire public during his testimony. 433 However,
closure of the courtroom was ordered to protect the defendant's
life and identity as a police informant. 4 34
During trial, the defendant made a motion to close the
courtroom during his testimony. 4 35 His defense at trial was that
he possessed and sold drugs as a police informant. 436 The
defendant argued that the public would gain knowledge of his
identity as an informant if the trial were open to the public; thus,
public knowledge of his identity as an agent for the police would
put his life at risk as well as render him ineffective as an
informant. 437 The court denied the motion to exclude the public
based solely on the defendant's waiver of his right to a public
trial. 438 However, it granted his request for a hearing to
determine whether there were competing interests overriding
those served by a public trial. 4 39 In light of the fact that
disclosure of the defendant's identity as a police informant would
jeopardize his life, the court upheld the motion. 44 0
As mentioned, the issue of whether a defendant has the right to
a private trial as a correlation of the defendant's right to a public
trial was indicated to be one of first impression in New York.44 1
In the typical closure case, it is the defendant who claims that his

sodomy... the court may, in its discretion, exclude [those not directly
interested], excepting jurors, witnesses, and officers of the court.
d.
432. C.M., 161 Misc. 2d at 575, 614 N.Y.S.2d at 492.
433. Id.

434.
435.
436.
437.
438.
439.
440.
441.

Id. at 580, 614 N.Y.S.2d at 495.
Id. at 574-75, 614 N.Y.S.2d at 492.
Id. at 575, 614 N.Y.S.2d at 492.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 580, 614 N.Y.S.2d at 495.
Id.
Id. at 575, 614 N.Y.S.2d at 492.
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or her public trial right has been violated. 442 Although there have
been several instances when a criminal defendant has sought to

exclude specific entities (e.g. the press) from a trial, here the
443
defendant sought to exclude the public entirely.

Without the aid of direct precedent on the issue, 4 4 4 the C.M.

court's reasoning began with an assessment of the right to a
public trial. It acknowledged that the right to a public trial is well
settled in both state and federal jurisprudence. 445 The court then
442. See, e.g., Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 43 N.Y.2d 370, 372 N.E.2d
544, 401 N.Y.S.2d 756, af4'd, 443 U.S. 368 (1977). This case involved a
motion by Gannett Co., a large media conglomerate, claiming exclusion of the
press violated the First Amendment. Id. at 374, 372 N.E.2d at 546, 401
N.Y.S.2d at 758. Stressing the unique nature of this motion, the court stated
"[it is typically the defendant... who reminds us on appeal from cases of
compelled disclosure that the right to a public trial is a constitutional guarantee
which 'the accused shall enjoy.'" Id. at 376, 372 N.E.2d at 547, 401
N.Y.S.2d at 759 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. VI. and N.Y. Civ. RIGnTS LAW
§ 12 (McKinney 1992)). Thus, the Gannett court pointed out that the right to a
public trial was primarily that of the accused. Id. at 376, 372 N.E.2d at 547,
401 N.Y.S.2d at 759. After all, the court reasoned, it is the defendant's liberty
interest which is at stake. Id.
443. C.M., 161 Misc. 2d at 575, 614 N.Y.S.2d at 492.
444. Id. It would appear that any ambiguity arising from this issue would
be a result of interpreting state law. In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (plurality opinion), the Court was asked for the
first time to decide "whether a criminal trial itself may be closed to the public
upon the unopposed request of a defendant, without any demonstration that the
closure is required to protect the defendant's superior right to a fair trial, or
that some other overriding consideration requires disclosure." Id. at 563-64.
The Court held that the right of the public and the press to attend criminal
trials is implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment. However, this was
only a plurality decision. Id. at 580. The lead opinion of Burger, C.J., joined
by White, J., & Stevens, J., observed that "the Bill of Rights was enacted
against the long history of trials being presumptively open." Id. at 575. As a
matter of federal constitutional interpretation, Richmond Newspapers would
seem right on point. Interestingly enough, the C.M. court states there are no
precedents on this issue without ever citing Richmond Newspapers. C.M., 161
Misc. 2d at 575, 614 N.Y.S.2d at 492. Thus, the ambiguity would appear to
be a result of the court's expansive reading of the defendant's rights under
state law.
445. C.M., 161 Misc. 2d at 575, 614 N.Y.S.2d at 492. Here the court cites
to the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution which provides in
relevant part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
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cited Gannett Co. v. DePasquale,44 6 stating the well established
rule that "the right to an open trial is presumed." 44 7 This
presumption of an open trial, according to Gannett, serves
various constitutional interests. 448 For example, although
a... public trial." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The court also referred to
relevant New York statutory law. See N.Y. Civ. RiGiTS LAW § 12 (McKinney
1992); see also N.Y. JUD. LAW § 4 (McKinney 1992).
446. 43 N.Y.2d 370, 372 N.E.2d 544, 401 N.Y.S.2d 756, 4f'd, 443 U.S.
363 (1977). In Gannett, a highly publicized murder trial, the trial court
ordered closure of the courtroom during evidentiary proceedings. Id. at 374,
372 N.E.2d at 546, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 758. Gannett claimed that exclusion of
the press violated First Amendment guarantees. Id. The New York Court of
Appeals concluded that the defendant's right to a fair trial unfettered by undue
prejudice and the promotion of the orderly administration of justice
outweighed the First Amendment interest advanced by Gannett. Id. at 381, 372
N.E.2d at 551, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 763.
447. C.M., 161 Misc. 2d at 575, 614 N.Y.S.2d at 492 (citing Gannett, 43
N.Y.2d at 376, 372 N.E.2d at 547, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 759).
448. Gannett, 43 N.Y.2d at 377, 372 N.E.2d at 547, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 759.
Although Gannett points out that the primary interest served by a public trial is
to assure a criminal defendant a fair proceeding as public trials check judicial.
abuse, the Gannett court stated, "this priority need not detract from the
public's general interest in the assurance of fair as well as effective
enforcement of its laws." Id. Thus, Gannett states, "each of us shares a stake
in an adversary system which consistently dispenses our law impartially." Id.
(citing U.S. CONST. amend. V, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV and N.Y. CONST.
art. I, §§ 2, 6). If it is not altogether clear what constitutional or statutory
principle establishes the presumption of an open trial, still a trial open to the
public would appear to be a necessary concomitant of the democratic process.
The Supreme Court has never clearly defined the origin of the presumption of
an open trial. See, e.g., Ridimond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 575-80 (finding
the presumption of an open trial resting at least in part in the First and
Fourteenth Amendments). New York has been equally unclear as to where the
right to an open trial originated. See, e.g., People v. Jelke, 308 N.Y.2d 56,
61, 123 N.E.2d 769, 771, 125 N.Y.S.2d 244, 246 (1954) (stating, "[o]f
uncertain origin, but nevertheless firmly rooted in the common law, the right
to a public trial has long been regarded as a fundamental privilege of the
defendant in a criminal prosecution"). The preceding cases do make clear,
however, that the right to a public trial protects interests exclusive of the
defendant's right to a public trial embodied in the Sixth Amendment. New
York statutory law makes this point. For example, New York Civil Rights
Law § 12 stresses that "the accused" shall enjoy the right to a public trial. See
N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 12 (McKinney 1992). New York Judiciary Law
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Gannett recognized that the primary interest served by a public
trial is preservation of the defendant's right to a fair proceeding
free from judicial abuse, it pointed out that the general public
also has an interest in fair trials and effective enforcement of the
law. 44 9 Thus, by citing Gannett to state the right to an open trial
is presumed, the C.M. court effectively stated that other values
are being served which are not rooted in the Sixth Amendment.
Along this line of reasoning, concluding that the defendant's right
to a public trial did not convey an absolute right to compel a
private one, the New York Supreme Court established
constitutional interests in a public trial exclusive of the
constitutional rights of the accused. 4 50
In its analysis, the court laid out two primary interests
preserved by the right to a public trial. First, the court cited to
People v. Clemons,45 1 which reasoned that a paramount interest
served by a public trial is to protect the defendant's right to a fair
trial. 452 In this regard, the Clemons court stated that "knowledge
that every criminal trial is subject to contemporaneous review in
the forum of public opinion is an effective restraint on the
possible abuse of judicial power.' 4 53 The other policy the C.M.
court asserted to be advanced by the public trial was one of
judicial integrity. 454 Here, the court referred to People v.
section 4, on the other hand, states that "every citizen may freely attend"
trials. See N.Y. JUD. LAW § 4 (McKinney 1992).

449. Gannett, 43 N.Y.2d at 377, 372 N.E.2d at 547, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 759.
450. See supra note 448 and accompanying text (indicating the presumption
of an open trial serves due process and First Amendment interests of the
general public as well as protecting the accused's Sixth Amendment right to a
public trial).
451. 78 N.Y.2d 48, 574 N.E.2d 1039, 571 N.Y.S.2d 433 (1991). In
Clemons, the defendant was charged with various offenses involving an alleged
rape. Id. at 50, 574 N.E.2d at 1040, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 434. The trial court
asked the prosecution if they requested closure and the prosecution replied that
they did. Id. Without articulating any reason, the trial judge closed the
courtroom. Id. The New York Court of Appeals held that although the right to
a public trial is not absolute, it was a fundamental privilege, and could not be
denied without sufficiently articulated competing interests. Id.
452. Id. at 51, 574 N.E.2d at 1040, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 434.
453. Id. (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 (1948)).
454. C.M., 161 Misc. 2d at 575, 614 N.Y.S.2d at 492.
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Jones,455 where it was determined that public trials promote
testimonial trustworthiness. 4 56 For example, the C.M. court
pointed out that making trials 'open to the public increases a
witness' apprehension that untruthful testimony will be
detected. 457 By noting this latter policy rooted in preserving
judicial integrity, the court effectively stated that there are

interests served by a public trial that are not rooted in the
defendant's Sixth Amendment right. This supports the court's
conclusion that the defendant's right to a public trial does not
absolutely convey the right to compel a private one.
After discussing the interests giving rise to the presumption of
an open trial, the court directly confronted the issue of whether
the defendant could receive a private trial, as a matter of law, by
waiving his right to a public trial. The court looked to federal
law, citing Singer v. U.S.,458 which reasoned by analogy that no
correlative right to a private trial derived from the public trial
right, 45 9 holding that the right to a jury trial did not convey the
right to be tried by a judge alone. 460 The C.M. court approved of
the implication that Singer derived from the Third Circuit case,
U.S. v. Kobli,4 61 which found that a defendant may waive the
right to a public trial under certain circumstances. 4 62 In light of
455. 82 A.D.2d 674, 442 N.Y.S.2d 999 (2d Dep't 1981).
456. Id. at 677, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 1001. See People v. Jelke, 308 N.Y.2d
56, 62, 123 N.E.2d 769, 771, 125 N.Y.S.2d 244, 246 (1954). The Jee court
stated that publicity of trials preserves fairness to the defendant by deterring
judicial abuse and has also "been deemed to play an important role in assuring
testimonial trustworthiness, by inducig the fear of exposure of testimony
falsely given, as well as in bringing notice of the proceedings to the attention
of possible witnesses who may not be known to the parties." Id. at 62-63, 123
N.E.2d at 772, 125 N.Y.S.2d at 246 (citations omitted).
457. C.M., 161 Misc. 2d at 575, 614 N.Y.S.2d at 492.
458. 380 U.S. 24 (1964). In Singer, the defendant in a federal criminal
fraud case claimed that he had an absolute right to be tried by a judge alone.
Id. at 25-26. The Court rejected the claim that the Sixth Amendment jury trial
right provided a correlative right to be tried by a judge. Id. at 26.
459. Id. at 34-35.
460. Id. at 34.
461. 172 F.2d 919 (3d Cir. 1949).
462. Id. at 920 n.2. In a case of notoriety, Kobli was charged with
transporting her niece across state lines to place her into prostitution in
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this synthesis of Singer and Kobli, the C.M. court held that "as
with other constitutional rights, the defendant's right to waive a
public trial is not 'absolute or inflexible"' and, therefore, he had
no correlative right to a private trial as an implication of his
4 63
public trial right.
Despite its ruling on this motion, the C.M. court granted the
defendant's alternative request for a hearing to determine whether
4 64
there were sufficiently articulated interests justifying closure.

In order to balance the competing interests, the court relied on
the four-prong test set out in Waller v. Georgia.465 Under
violation of the Mann Act. Id. Because young girls were expected to be at the
trial which would concern lewd issues, the judge ordered the courtroom
closed. Id. Although the defendant's counsel objected and requested a public
trial, the counsel for the other three co-defendants did not object to the
closure. Id. The Third Circuit found that the three co-defendants had waived
their right to a public trial. Id.
463. C.M., 161 Misc. 2d at 576, 614 N.Y.S.2d at 493. In reaching its
conclusion that the right to waive a public trial is not "absolute or inflexible,"
the C.M. court quoted Judge Cooke's dissent from Gannett. Id. Judge Cooke
stated, "[ilt is no answer to suggest the right to a public trial is waiveable at
the option of the accused. As the right to a public trial knows no correlative
right to a private one, such a waiver cannot automatically close the court." 43
N.Y.2d at 387-88, 372 N.E.2d at 555, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 767 (Cooke, J.,
dissenting) (citing Singer, 380 U.S. at 34-35).
464. C.M., 161 Misc. 2d at 578, 614 N.Y.S.2d at 494.

465. 467 U.S. 39 (1984). In Waller, court-authorized wiretapping of
telephones by Georgia police provided probable cause that a large lottery
operation existed and the police searched various places, including the
defendants' homes. Id. at 41. Subsequently, the defendants were indicted for
violating state gambling statutes. Id. At a suppression hearing, the state moved
to close the proceeding to the public. Id. Georgia alleged that publicizing the
information obtained from the wiretap would render this evidence inadmissible
as it involved privacy interests of those not indicted. Id. The trial court
sustained the motion upon finding that insofar as the wiretap evidence related
to alleged offenders not then on trial, the evidence would be tainted and,
therefore, inadmissible at trial. Id. at 42. Over defendants' objections, the
court excluded all persons from the courtroom during the suppression hearing
except witnesses, court personnel, the parties and their lawyers. Id. The
hearing lasted for seven days, though less than two and one-half hours were
devoted to playing the tapes made from the intercepted phone conversations.
Id. On review, the Court held that closure of the entire hearing was unjustified
because it was overly broad and not based on adequately articulated findings.
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Waller, the defendant carries the burden of showing first, an
overriding interest that will be prejudiced; second, that the
requested closure is no broader than necessary; third, the court
must make adequate findings to support the closure; and fourth,
the court must consider other reasonable alternatives. 466
Applying Waller, the New York Supreme Court in C.M.
upheld the closure motion. 467 In support of his motion, the
defendant argued that without exclusion of the public during his
testimony, he could not fully present himself without placing his
life in jeopardy. 4 68 First, the court determined that this was a
sufficient overriding interest. 4 69 Second, the .court found (in
compliance with Waler's third prong) that the defendant had
been involved in fights and placed in protective custody in
prison. 470 The court reasoned that the defendant was placed into
a situation where testifying would put his life in danger and
refusing to testify would compromise his fair trial right. 4 71 Thus,
the overriding interest asserted by the defendant, and found
sufficient by the court relates to the due process right to be heard,
which would be thoroughly chilled if the court adhered to the
Id. at 48-49. Moreover, the Court concluded that adequate alternatives were
not considered. Id.
466. C.M., 161 Misc. 2d at 577, 614 N.Y.S.2d at 493-94 (citing Waller,
467 U.S. at 48).
467. Id. at 580-81, 614 N.Y.S.2d at 495-96.
468. Id. at 577, 614 N.Y.S.2d at 494. See People v. Hinton, 31 N.Y.2d
71, 75, 286 N.E.2d 265, 267, 334 N.Y.S.2d 885, 889 (1972), cert. denied,
410 U.S. 911 (1973) (stating that exclusion of the public is often ordered "to
shield the identity of a witness from the public and preserve not only [an
informant's] future usefulness, but also [the informant's] lifM").
469. C.M., 161 Misc. 2d at 579, 614 N.Y.S.2d at 495.
470. Id.
471. Id. at 579-80, 614 N.Y.S.2d at 495. The C.M. court stated that this
dilemma had "constitutional ramifications." Id. The court found that the
defendant faced a risk to his life that would effectively limit his right to testify
and, therefore, present a defense. Id. The court reasoned that the constitutional
due process right to be heard would be compromised if the trial remained
open. Id. Thus, the court concluded, "[hlere the defendant shares 'the public's
interest in avoiding any developments that would threaten to truncate a
defendant's right to a fair trial."' Id. (quoting Gannett, 43 N.Y.2d at 380, 372
N.E.2d at 549, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 771).
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presumption of an open trial. 472 Third, because closure was only
requested during defendants testimony, it was found to be no
broader than was necessary. 473 Finally, no reasonable
alternatives were advanced or found by the court to be
available. 474
As mentioned, the issue of whether the right to a public trial
can be waived and provide the defendant the right to compel a

private trial was one of first impression for New York. 475 In
reaching its decision, the C.M. court applied Singer and Kobli. A
synthesis of these cases established that there was no correlative
right to a private trial as an implication of the right to a public
trial under the Sixth Amendment. In doing so, the court refrained
from expanding the right to a public trial under New York State
law. Thus, both the New York and federal right to a public trial

do not convey the right to obtain a private trial simply by waiver.
Both jurisdictions presume the trial to be open to the public.
Both New York and federal law are consistent in holding that

although there is no absolute right to a private trial, competing
interests may rebut the public trial presumption and warrant
courtroom closure. In this regard, New York follows the federal
test set out in Waller.4 76 Thus, New York does not confer any
472. C.M., 161 Misc. 2d at 579, 614 N.Y.S.2d at 495.
473. Id. at 580, 614 N.Y.S.2d at 495. Cf. Waller, 467 U.S. at 49-50
(excluding public for an entire seven day hearing overly broad where less than
two and one-half hours were devoted to playing tapes which were the subject
of the exclusion motion).
474. C.M., 161 Misc. 2d at 580, 614 N.Y.S.2d at 495.
475. Id. at 575, 614 N.Y.S.2d at 492.
476. See, e.g., People v. Kan, 78 N.Y.2d 54, 57, 574 N.E.2d 1042, 1044,
571 N.Y.S.2d 436, 438 (1991). In Kan, codefendants Kan, Ip, and an
accomplice were charged with distribution and possession of heroin. 78
N.Y.2d at 56, 574 N.E.2d at 1044, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 437. The accomplice was
enabled to plead guilty to a lesser charge in exchange for testimony inculpating

Kan and Ip. Id. The trial court conducted a hearing to determine whether
closure was warranted during the accomplice's testimony. Id. The accomplice
argued that closure was warranted because he would be working with law

enforcement as part of an ongoing criminal investigation and, therefore,
revealing his identity would render him ineffective. Id. at 58, 574 N.E.2d at
1044, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 438. Moreover, the accomplice stated that it feared
reprisal from Kan's "people," and also, others involved in the criminal
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greater freedom under its laws to a defendant requesting a private
trial. New York, currently following Singer and Waller, holds
that a defendant seeking to rebut the public trial presumption

must show first, an overriding interest that is likely to be
prejudiced; second, that the closure requested is no broader than
necessary; third, the court ordering closure must make adequate
findings to support this action; and fourth, the court must assess
any reasonable alternatives. 47 7

investigation. Id. The accomplice did not, however, express fear of Kan's
family. Id. Over Kan's objection, the trial court ordered closure of the
courtroom to all spectators, during the accomplice's testimony. Id. at 56, 574
N.E.2d at 1043, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 437. Citing Waller, the court of appeals
held that exclusion of everyone from the trial during the accomplice's
testimony was broader than constitutionally tolerable and thus, constitated a
violation of Kan's right to a public trial. The exclusion of Kan's family in
particular, was not justified by the record. Id. at 59, 574 N.E.2d at 1045, 571
N.Y.S.2d at 439.
477. Waller, 467 U.S. at 48. See Kan, 78 N.Y.2d at 57, 574 N.E.2d at
1044, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 438.
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